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RETHINKING TOTALITARIAN IDEOLOGY:  
INSIGHTS FROM THE ANTI-TOTALITARIAN CANON 
 
 
Richard Shorten 
  University of Birmingham 
 
 
Abstract 
 
‘Totalitarianism’ first emerged in interwar Europe, and did so as an explicit intellectual 
engagement.  Thereafter, it persisted as a point of reflection, often more implicitly, and in 
political theorising especially.  The main product of the initial engagement was a structural 
model isolating a discrete regime-type and marginalising the ideological dimension. Over 
time, dissatisfaction with the model became widespread.  But dissatisfaction ought not to 
exclude the possibility that it was the relatively looser intellectual attention which followed 
that contains all the resources sufficient for constructing a more compelling account.  By 
tracking debates in twentieth-century political thought, we can clarify the content of a new 
ideology-oriented, ‘post-revisionist’ theory of totalitarianism: its coherence as an ideational 
product is to be found in the synthesis of three distinct currents of thought (utopianism, 
scientism, and revolutionary violence), emphasised in disproportion by three consecutive 
positions taken up across the ‘anti-totalitarian canon’. Evaluating these three positions turns 
out to raise issues that are conceptual, contextual and empirical.  Attending to those leads us, 
lastly, to reflect on the understanding of ideology itself that may be appropriate to 
conceptualising ‘totalitarian ideology’. 
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RETHINKING TOTALITARIAN IDEOLOGY:  
INSIGHTS FROM THE ANTI-TOTALITARIAN CANON 
 
Commentators, whether they are historians, social scientists, or philosophers, usually think 
they know well enough what the theory of totalitarianism is, even if they may have reason to 
dispute its usefulness.   ‘Strictly defined’, writes Anne Applebaum, ‘a totalitarian regime is 
one which bans all institutions apart from those it has officially approved’.1  It is therefore a 
regime characterised by the existence of a single political party, a single educational system, 
a single moral code, and so forth.  Operating on the same assumptions, we can similarly find 
Leszek Kolakowski affirming that, in respect of the Soviet Union, ‘the totalitarian character 
of the regime – i.e. the progressive destruction of civil society and absorption of all forms of 
social life by the state’, is something which ‘increased almost without interruption between 
1924 and 1953’.2  And equally, if we look to the historian Richard Overy’s rejection of a 
‘political-science fantasy’, we discover a ‘totalitarian model’ in which particular public 
figures wield total, unlimited power: regimes of ‘domination through fear by psychopathic 
tyrants’.3 
 This structural model of totalitarianism tends to foreground a specific feature: the 
exercise of total control, emanating outwards from a political centre, typically facilitated by 
the technological reach of the modern state.  The problem is its state-centredness.  It 
postulates an optimum degree of social control, a society totally pervaded and shaped by 
those in power.  Applebaum exemplifies this tendency because she contends that the ‘best’ 
definition of the term is still Mussolini’s: ‘Everything within the state, nothing outside of the 
                                                          
1
 A. Applebaum, Iron Curtain (London, 2012), p. xxiii. 
2
 L. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism (London, 2005), p. 794. 
3
 R. Overy, The Dictators (New York, 2004), pp. xxvii, 73. 
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state, nothing against the state’. 4   Those who reject the structural model are known as 
‘revisionists’.  Variously, they challenge how far total control was reality rather than just 
aspiration;
5
 restrict totalitarianism’s usefulness to an aid in Western liberal-democratic self-
understanding, by way of a negative template;
6
 or even denigrate it as a self-serving tool of 
domestic political legitimation.
7
  But the point is that revisionists do all of these things only 
inconclusively if they take Mussolini’s definition to be the authoritative one.  What if 
Mussolini’s boast – irrespective of its attainment in social and political practice – misses what 
were truly the animating purposes of a new political formation, ones that perhaps better 
matched aspirations embodied in Hitler’s Third Reich and Stalin’s Soviet Union?  The 
structural conception of totalitarianism abstracts from Mussolini when it makes the chief 
aspiration ‘statist’.8  But totalitarian ideology, especially as expressed in Hitler’s Third Reich 
and Stalin’s Soviet Union, was richer than to simply make the state an end-in-itself.  
Totalitarianism, it will be argued here, should cease to be understood as denoting an 
(a)typical set of institutional arrangements and corresponding practices, and begin to be 
appreciated instead in terms of the shared ideological space between ostensibly dichotomous 
prescriptive visions, and in this way as comprising particular beliefs, attitudes and outlooks 
that were no less striking.   In other words, one special motivation for what is offered below 
is to call time on the convention whereby we treat ‘fascism’ and ‘communism’ as distinctive 
                                                          
4
 Applebaum, Iron Curtain, xiii.  See B. Mussolini, ‘The Doctrine of Fascism’, in T. Ball and R. Dagger (ed.), 
Ideals and Ideologies (New York, 1991), pp. 288-97. 
5
 E.g. W.S. Allen, ‘Totalitarianism: The Concept and the Reality’, in E. Menze (ed.), Totalitarianism 
Reconsidered  (Port Washington NY, 1981), pp. 97-107.   
6
 M. Halberstam, Totalitarianism and the Modern Conception of Politics (New Haven CT, 2000). 
7
 S. Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? (London, 2001). 
8
 Ironically, compared against the contemporaneous regimes in Germany and Russia, historians generally find 
that Fascist Italy was the least (structurally) totalitarian. E.g. A. de Grand, ‘Cracks in the Façade: The Failure of 
Fascist Totalitarianism in Italy’, European History Quarterly, 21 (1991) pp. 515-35. 
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ideological formations but employ ‘totalitarianism’, by contrast, to refer to a practice of 
political rule that corresponds to fascism/ communism-in-power. 
 Up to a point it might fairly be objected that the picture presented of contemporary 
totalitarianism theory has omitted to mention several fruitful lines of enquiry this intended 
contribution joins up with.  Several theorists have, over the last couple of decades, been 
active in the process of trying to clarify the content of a new version of totalitarianism 
theory.
9
  However, one significant reason why such attempts have often fallen short is 
because they have largely ignored the resources contained within the history of political 
thought.  That the history of political thought should hold out this prospect is, in one sense, 
counter-intuitive.  An adequate conception of totalitarian ideology must certainly be informed 
by a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of intellectual transmission than the kind 
implied, for instance, in Bertrand Russell’s famous statement, in A History of Western 
Philosophy, that ‘at the present time, Hitler is an outcome of Rousseau’.10   Nevertheless, the 
broader point is that twentieth-century political thought was informed in important ways by 
reflection upon totalitarianism, both with respect to its intellectual heritage, and with regard 
also to the ethical problems posed by the realities of the Nazi Holocaust and the political 
mass murder committed in the name of Soviet communism. 
 Where the structural version of totalitarianism theory dates back to Friedrich and 
Brzezinski’s Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1956) and, beyond that, to explicit 
                                                          
9
 S. Tormey, Making Sense of Tyranny (Manchester, 1995); T. Todorov, Hope and Memory (London, 2005); E. 
Gentile, Politics as Religion, trans. by G. Staunton (Princeton NJ, 2006), esp. ch. 6; D.D. Roberts, The 
Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth-Century Europe (London, 2006); and A. J. Gregor, Totalitarianism and 
Political Religion (Stanford CA, 2012). 
10
 B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (London, 1961), p. 660.  Russell’s statement is dated, of course.  
Yet accounts of totalitarianism’s philosophical ancestry continue to be informed by an unreflective notion of 
intellectual transmission.  See, for example, Y. Sherratt, Hitler’s Philosophers (New Haven and London, 2013), 
where the metaphorical device of the ‘poisoned chalice’ (p. 61) is quite typical of a habit of ducking 
methodological issues by idiomatic expression. 
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intellectual engagement with totalitarianism in the interwar period,
11
 political theorising in 
the post-1945 period took up the issue less systematically – sometimes obliquely – but nearly 
always with its ideological identity in mind.  Accordingly, it is by tracking debates in 
twentieth-century political thought that we might construct a new ideology-oriented – ‘post-
revisionist’ – theory of totalitarianism.  In what follows we shall consider, in chronological 
order, three schools of thought that, at successive intervals, enacted significant revisions to 
what thereafter grew into received accounts in the hands of political theorists.
12
   Viewed in 
retrospect, each of these accounts owed a good deal to their local contexts of articulation, so 
that there is reason to appraise them with these contexts in mind: each school of thought 
tended to view totalitarianism from the vantage point of concerns ‘closer to home’, to put the 
matter colloquially.  Furthermore, as we shall see, there are question marks that need to be 
placed against the internal cogency of some of the arguments offered, as well as their ‘fit’ 
with the available historical evidence.  Before that, however, from a disciplinary perspective, 
the relationship between totalitarianism and various pertinent applications of the idea of ‘the 
canon’ warrants some attention.  
 
The anti-totalitarian canon and totalitarianism’s (semi-)canonical sources 
From the disciplinary standpoint of the history of political thought, a first proposition, that 
there is such a thing as an anti-totalitarian canon,
 
which might moreover be a fertile source of 
insight not only into political justification after totalitarianism but also into the ideological 
make-up of a totalitarian project, is perhaps less controversial than a second proposition, that 
this project has canonical sources.  Neither proposition, however, is without complication.  
                                                          
11
 C. Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge MA, 1956).   
12
 An omission in this chronological scheme is Hannah Arendt, for the reason that it is impossible to assign her 
thought a determinate place within it; rather, she might be thought to have something to say to each of the three 
lines of interpretation.    
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Let us consider what is at stake respectively, for we may anticipate that our proposed exercise 
will commit us to some version of each. 
Concerning our first proposition, canons are usually thought of as comprising the 
select key works that have, over time, and in virtue of repeated reference to them, ‘earned’ a 
special place within a given field of cultural life.  In the particular field of political theory, 
there tends to be a further connotation: that the canon is a set of works as ‘texts’, unified in 
virtue not only of accumulated reference across them, but also of raising the same ‘perennial 
problems’.13  Hence, the very idea that there is a readily-identifiable political theory canon is 
potentially compromised by a counter-possibility: that questions are not recurrently raised, 
but depend instead on time and place.
14
  Our question must be: what would this mean for an 
anti-totalitarian canon?   
We can say, initially, that an anti-totalitarian canon would resist compromise by this 
counter-possibility, since it would be largely untouched by problems of historical distance.  
Any claim to a timeless frame of reference would be jettisoned because all that would be 
supposed is the identity of problems persisting across a finite period of time.
15
  No more than 
this notion would apply: that roughly between 1945 and the half-century that followed, some 
political theorists asked a single, persistent question; namely, ‘how should political and social 
life be ordered with the Holocaust and the Gulag in consideration?’.  ‘Some’ here is a suitable 
qualification – for if what we want to do is to give an anti-totalitarian canon substantive 
meaning, we are not required to assert that every political theorist working in this period 
posed the question.    Our initial alighting on firmer ground will not, however, hold for very 
                                                          
13
 G.H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (London, 1937), p. 4 
14
 Q. Skinner ‘Meaning and Understanding in the  History of Ideas’, History and Theory, 8 (1) (1969), pp. 3-53. 
15
 R. Lamb, ‘Skinner’s Revised Historical Contextualism: A Critique’, History of the Human Sciences, 22 
(2009) pp. 59-63. 
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long.  Other misgivings will likely arise.  How are we to determine membership of this 
canon?  To have asked the question must be among the criteria.  Although we might think 
that we are not obliged to specify any other, since that would only raise the issue, more 
general to the discipline, of what counts as ‘political theory’.   Can we take statements of 
anti-totalitarianism at face-value? Again, no special defence would seem due of the 
presumption that any member of our canon is asking a question actually-articulated, rather 
than another one less transparent.  There is a further issue, though, no less general yet acutely 
relevant, that picks up on the latter misgiving.  This concerns permutations on the question of 
how to order political and social life post-Holocaust and post-Gulag. 
Even when, across a condensed historical space, a question persists, that question may 
nevertheless be given important variation in inflection, perhaps depending on what we might 
think of as the most immediate time and place.  Importantly, because locating that inflection 
may require alertness to the detail of the postwar conversation we are projecting, it transpires, 
after all, that framing a persistent problem should not divert our attention from the kind of 
‘contexts’ usually called on to challenge the status of canons.  Variation in the inflection of 
the question, furthermore, is likely to bear strongly on the use we wish to make of an anti-
totalitarian canon, since it would be inconsistent to suppose that ‘totalitarianism’ posed 
political theorists any non-opaque problem – one not liable to be given local inflection – 
when dispute over totalitarianism’s identity is our very purpose in revisiting political theory’s 
contribution.  The relevant point is that particular methodological implications follow: just as, 
properly-conceived, thinking totalitarian ideology is an exercise not only in studying primary 
texts – Hitler’s Mein Kampf, or Stalin’s speeches to Party congresses – but also in employing 
a contextual reading of those sources, then by that token the same must apply to (re)thinking 
totalitarian ideology on the resource of twentieth-century political thought.  The ‘secondary 
text-sources’ in the latter case – theorists’ accounts – will have their contexts as well, 
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variously linguistic, political, social, and cultural. It is to these that we can anticipate tracing a 
question’s permutation.  And, significantly for our proposed exercise, it is in light of some 
appreciation of those permutations that we can hope to give the accounts better appraisal.  
 If our first proposition is robust, then, and if defending the idea of an anti-totalitarian 
canon serves further as pointer to appropriate strategies for its uses, what of our second, 
perhaps more challenging, proposition?  That totalitarianism itself has canonical sources in 
one sense returns us to our previous point.  We would expect statements of anti-totalitarian 
political philosophy to ‘implicate’ specific sources depending upon the particular permutation 
of the question being asked.  In another sense, that we should even be interested in the 
proposition is a function of disciplinary conventions: to write – think? – in the terms of 
canonical figures and/ or their texts, often as a shorthand for arguments.  Disciplinary 
convention is one way, indeed, in which we are free to interpret Bertrand Russell’s statement 
on Rousseau and Hitler: not as a statement of causality in a particular instance, rather as a 
general judgment on where, in political life, the well-known Rousseauian arguments lead (the 
General Will, the Lawgiver, the civil religion).  However, it is the interpretation contrariwise 
– Russell’s as a causal statement – that takes us to the central point regarding the complexion 
of a totalitarian project, and this concerns ideological inheritance and the continuity of ideas 
across time.  For totalitarian ideology to have a canonical source must either imply, first, that 
the former was (already) present in the latter or, second, that the ideology appears later, but is 
nonetheless causally-derived – perhaps in partial, indirect, complex ways – from the source in 
question.  Let us consider the both scenarios.  
 The first scenario, given reflection, can be ruled out as too improbable to arise.  To 
locate totalitarian ideology as already ‘in’ any canonical source would be to imagine a very 
unlikely continuity, granting several considerations.  One is our general inclination to think 
Rethinking totalitarian ideology 
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that the twentieth-century formations were ‘unprecedented’ and/ or ‘unique’.16  Another is the 
general intellectual remoteness of our sources from the rather-less-cerebral conditions, 
politically and socially, in which the later formations emerged.  For the analyst to credit this 
scenario is also, perhaps, to succumb to the temptation of her vantage point: the intrusion of 
hindsight, so as to give continuity a false impression.  ‘No one in 1880 could have imagined a 
Hitler’, writes Fritz Stern, ‘any more than in 1933 people could have imagined an 
Auschwitz’.17  Acute awareness that an outcome is troubling is, of course, what can colour a 
source’s perception, as some infamous examples show.18  Looming is the ‘mythology of 
prolepsis’, imposing retrospective significance in the intellectual history of totalitarianism in 
ways that distort that history.
19
 
 It is because it drops the claim for continuity, however, that the second scenario 
stands up to scrutiny far better, and demands more of our attention.  Picturing totalitarian 
ideology having a relation to a canonical source so that while the ideology appears later there 
is nonetheless a transmission of ideas between the two implies, importantly, a notion of 
ideational change.  In picturing so – and to return to the term ‘implicate’ we specified before 
– we should be clear about the standards to which the canon is being held: ‘causal’ 
implication comprises later ‘readers’ – totalitarians – making use of a past philosophical 
figure’s words, and entails only that degree of moral responsibility attached to what (we 
                                                          
16
 Cf. D. Stone, ‘The Historiography of the Holocaust: Beyond “Uniqueness” and Ethnic Competition’, 
Rethinking History, 8 (1) (2004) pp. 127-42. 
17
 Cited in G. Wheatcroft, ‘Hello to All That!’, New York Review of Books, LVIII (11), 23 June 2011, p. 32. 
18
 Cf. Karl Popper’s construction of Plato’s ‘noble lie’ – conventionally translated as the ‘myth of metal and 
earth’ – as the proto-Nazi ‘myth of blood and soil’.  Plato, The Republic, trans. D. Lee (London, 1987), p. 182; 
Popper, Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 1, The Spell of Plato (London, 1999), p. 139. 
19
 Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding’, pp. 22-3. 
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think) those figures should, and should not, have omitted to mention.
20
   It is the detail of this 
transmission, rather, that raises the practical issues so far as investigation is concerned.   At 
what point, exactly, do the mechanisms for transmission become so indirect and convoluted 
that we have to make the judgment that, after consulting the available evidence of texts, 
historical political discourse, and other records of political activity, a purported canonical 
source is no source at all?  These are mechanisms likely to consist, for example, in the broad-
level dissemination of ideas, their unconscious repetitions, their remaking to meet the 
demands of new practical circumstances, and so forth.  Further, just what sort of ‘line’ of 
causal derivation would we be hoping to find?  In order to negotiate issues like these, what 
we might propose, finally, is the practical value of deploying a particular device: the idea of 
the ‘representative thinker’. 
The history of political thought is not traditionally attuned to dealing in ideational 
content that is loose, fragmentary, and open-ended.  Texts, arguments, concepts, and (types 
of) context are all conventionally-fixed units of analysis.  Likewise, thinking totalitarian 
ideology has, in the past, comprised a search for ‘unified wholes’.21  But required in the 
exercise about to be commenced may be the disaggregation of lines-of-derivation in the 
plural,
22
 so that the (semi-)canonical sources are several not singular; and so that 
‘implication’ is not either/or, but consists rather in degrees.  Framing the connections 
between the history of ideas and totalitarian ideology accordingly resonates with the idea of a 
‘representative thinker’ because, deployed as a device, it might allow for these nuances in 
                                                          
20
 This point is often confused.  Hence familiar figures in a kind of ‘anti-canon’ are subjected to wildly 
disproportionate censure, on grounds often left vague.  For the term ‘anti-canon’, see J. Rée, Philosophical Tales 
(London, 1987), pp. 42-3.  For a good discussion, see G. Kateb, ‘The Adequacy of the Canon’, Political Theory, 
30 (4) (2002) pp. 482-505.  
21
 As Roberts has argued, the search for coherent visions for totalitarian societies is natural yet misconceived 
(The Totalitarian Experiment, pp. 39-45).  
22
 Though in need of disaggregation, note that these may be lines that are open to cutting-across one another at 
any point.  That too is a matter to be investigated according to the available evidence. 
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interpretation, while still retaining fidelity to some disciplinary conventions.  Let us begin 
with an attempt at definition, with our particular ends in view: the representative thinker 
shares ideational content in common with totalitarian ideology, but does not articulate that 
ideology in full avant la lettre, rather only in such quantity that minimally-present are the key 
elements constitutive of one of those lines of derivation.  What analytical purchase might this 
derive? By example, consider why Hobbes forfeits representative status.  Having supposedly  
proposed the ‘totalitarian state’ as solution to an omnipresence of deep-rooted social conflict, 
Hobbes was popularly made canonical source in the postwar years,
23
  though on this charge 
he has at best (or worst?) only a claim to have articulated key elements according to the 
outdated structural model. Clarification of the complexion of a totalitarian project is not the 
only pay-off here, since also on offer is a conception of the relationship with prior 
philosophical ideas that is carefully-qualified.  No representative thinker, à la Russell, will 
have ‘caused’ Hitler; rather, she may only be said to have indirectly lent legitimacy to 
emerging aspects of totalitarian ideology.  Lastly, fidelity to disciplinary conventions is such 
that ‘shorthands’ are kept available in order to express positions and tap into all the 
associations implied.  Of course, at the second-order level, it is this that enables our 
prospective engagement with texts in the anti-totalitarian canon that are already coded in the 
shorthand of specific canonical ‘targets’.  To anticipate one conclusion we shall eventually 
reach, one that has special implications for how totalitarianism’s ideological identity should 
be reconceived, the figures that are germane are, in their own ways, all architects of ‘post-’  
and ‘counter-’  Enlightenment visions.  In addition to anything else, therefore, thinking 
carefully about the adequacy of the respective representative thinkers that our anti-totalitarian 
                                                          
23
 E.g. G. Catlin, The Story of the Political Philosophers (New York, 1939), p. 238.  
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canon functioned with helps to contest injudicious ascriptions of a totalitarian identity to the 
Enlightenment mainstream.    
 
Three perspectives from the anti-totalitarian canon 
 
The view from Cold War liberalism 
Our first theoretical position assumed in the anti-totalitarian canon was that defended by the 
Cold War liberals. Prima facie, it may have appeared that Cold War liberalism, coming to 
sustain a particular consensus about totalitarianism in the 1950s, was no real departure from 
the default structural theory then in the process of being clarified by Friedrich and Brzezinski; 
for their six-point ‘syndrome’ definition made ample space – alongside the criteria of 
centralised state institutions and practices – for ‘passive adherence’ to an ‘official body of 
doctrine’, post-individualistic and ‘chiliastic’ in form. 24   ‘Chiliastic’ here is a proxy for 
‘utopia’ and, denoting the Kingdom of Christ on earth, it approximated what Cold War liberal 
thinkers usually (though not always) rendered into more secular terms of reference.
25
  The 
distinction of the Cold War liberals was (quite apart from dislodging the fixation on the state 
as end-in-itself) to put the accent on utopia, until it filled up nearly the whole of the 
conceptual space in the critique.  Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin, and Jacob Talmon are chief 
among the personalities in intellectual life who, in the immediate post-war decades, as 
tensions between East and West were ossifying, responded to the question about how 
political and social life should henceforth be ordered, by answering that ‘utopian’ schemes 
                                                          
24
 Friedrich and Bzrezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, pp. 21-22.  
25
 Some theorists of political religion continue to make ‘messianism’, ‘chiliasm’, ‘Heavenly City’, the ‘New 
Faith’, etc. into rough approximations of utopia.  Whether the religious idiom genuinely enriches an 
understanding is a moot point, particularly if there is no thesis of actual descent from religious sources.  See note 
95.   
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would need to be unambiguously ruled out.
26
  Popper’s contribution to the anti-totalitarian 
canon came via two books he labelled together his ‘war effort’.27  In Berlin’s case, it was via 
the manifold essays and lectures he authored and presented.
28
  Talmon went on to complete a 
trilogy on the theme.
29
 Appraising the theoretical cogency of these texts, primarily as 
normative accounts of anti-totalitarianism rather than rounder statements of (liberal) political 
philosophy, leads us to a balance sheet that is mixed: two recurring weaknesses are to 
conflate concepts and to employ them in rigid, binary oppositions.  Let us proceed by 
reviewing these weaknesses, before considering the (geo)political context, and then the 
strength of the available historical evidence. 
 Popper conceived ‘utopian’ schemes as one part – the undesirable, dangerous part – of 
a pair of possible solutions to social problems.  Schemes of utopian ‘social engineering’ were 
implemented in terms of ideal patterns or ‘blueprints for a new order’.  They therefore 
required a ‘clean canvas’ to start from.  There was no need for discussion and disagreement – 
these engineers simply affirmed ‘a singular, rigid version of the ideal state’; thus, these 
engineers were ‘omniscient as well as omnipotent’.  The dangerous element was the 
compulsion – in order to attain the clean canvas – to ‘purge, expel, banish, kill’.30  This was 
the ‘closed society’, for Popper, the purview of the first of his two texts; but utopianism was 
at fault too for a second reason: historicism.  It is the problem with ‘historicism’ that takes us 
                                                          
26
 See esp. J-W. Müller, ‘Fear and Freedom: On “Cold War liberalism”’, European Journal of Political Theory, 
7 (1) (2008) pp. 45-64. 
27
 Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 1, The Spell of Plato (London, 1999) and Vol. 2, The High 
Tide of Prophecy (London, 1999); Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London, 2002). 
28
 See esp. I. Berlin, ‘Historical Inevitability’ in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, 1969), 41-117; and Berlin, 
‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in ibid, pp. 118-172.   
29
 J. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London, 1952); Talmon, Political Messianism (London, 
1960); Talmon, The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution (London, 1980). 
30
 Popper, ‘Utopia and Violence’, in Conjectures and Refutations (London, 1995), 360; Popper, Open Society, 
Vol. 1, p. 166. 
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to the conceptual conflation in Popper’s case.  By historicism, Popper referred not to the 
conventional meaning, the idea that moral values are relative to historical periods, but to 
‘long-term prophecies’, aimed at discovering laws of history.31  This would be question-
begging in itself, though principally at issue is the counter-intuitive equation of utopianism 
with determinism.  Upon closer inspection, the real mark of utopians, in Popper’s theory, is 
not possession of a blueprint of the ideal state (albeit required), rather possession of a ‘plan or 
blueprint of the historical path that leads towards’ this state.32  In other words, this is social 
closure by historical prediction, not by confidence in a detailed picture of what the good 
society will look like.  The primary danger is not now the utopian engineer as a kind of 
Promethean figure, free to re-make society from the group upwards, but a specific kind of 
certainty as regards a supposedly ‘utopian’ project: that society is head inexorably in that 
direction regardless.  Contrary to its declared purpose here,
33
 liberal, anti-totalitarian 
‘piecemeal’ social engineering would seem to have its grounding not in anti-utopianism, but 
in anti-determinism.   
Isaiah Berlin’s statement of anti-totalitarianism could ostensibly be deemed to 
conflate the same.  Berlin associated utopianism with ‘monism’, and his attack on monist 
thinking began in the 1953 lecture ‘Historical Inevitability’.  Monism approximated to ‘the 
belief that some single formula can in principle be found whereby all the diverse ends of men 
can be harmoniously realised’. 34   But while monist thinking could be given particular 
expression in deterministic philosophies of history – being ordered around belief in a ‘single 
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“cosmic” over-all scheme which is the goal of the universe’ – those philosophies were not its 
necessary expression.
35
  Berlin was more careful because while he was outwardly clumsy to 
have said that monism pictured, at its core, the possibility of a perfect social harmony liable 
to be rendered as a ‘final’ state of affairs, by ‘final’ he really meant something-other-than-
predetermined: only arrival at a state that we have no further need to modify.  That being 
said, Berlin’s critique of totalitarianism did share at least one failing with Popper’s.  In effect, 
binary oppositions were reworked from closed/open society and utopian/piecemeal 
engineering to monism/pluralism and positive/negative liberty.  Jacob Talmon employed, 
lastly, his own blunter, though equally epistemologically-limiting, dichotomy: liberal versus 
totalitarian democracy.  These were two contrasting strands supposedly having emerged out 
of the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment, and Talmon’s definition of a totalitarian 
democracy echoed Berlin’s definition of monist thinking: it was ‘based upon the assumption 
of a sole and exclusive truth in politics’ and postulated a ‘preordained, harmonious and 
perfect scheme of things’.36   
 To have conflated and/ or crudely-bifurcated concepts is a fault of the Cold War 
liberal accounts internal to the texts. But an assessment of their contexts of reference points to 
a fault in the external dimension – their one-sidedness.  Biographically, most of the relevant 
figures had reason to make communism the primary target:  Berlin remarked that it was 
witnessing an angry mob in Petrograd that gave him his ‘lifelong horror of physical 
violence’.37  It was communism’s message to the workers that held the attention, and this 
message had an unambiguous producer – Marx, whose philosophy was made 
indistinguishable from Soviet communism, even as it was articulated during Stalinist times.  
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Marx for Popper, for example, was ‘the last of the great holistic system builders’, whose 
belief in historical inevitability lent Marx-ists a vital justification for suppressing the kinds of 
criticism that threatened to hold up the historical destiny.
38
  Indeed, Popper’s 
utopian/determinist conceptual conflation can be explained by this primary target: some 
commentators have suggested contrariwise that the Viennese-born Popper’s real concern was 
with fascism and with Marxism only indirectly, inasmuch as the absence of fascism from 
Marxism’s own blueprint blunted its capacity to resist fascism in central Europe (i.e. on 
classical Marxism, fascism should not have been a historical reality at all);
39
 though to 
suggest so rather concedes the point that, for Popper, the significance in Marxism was that it 
operated with a blueprint in the first place.  This hostile and selective rendering of Marx 
extends to Berlin’s treatment.  There, Marx becomes a principal exponent of positive liberty –  
the freedom ‘to lead one’s prescribed form of life’ – who, by doing so, adopts a supremely 
coercive stance towards the individual human personality, for two salient reasons: first, 
because he pictures ‘self-realisation’ in unity – i.e. conformity – with the self-realisation of a 
collective political subject; second, because his framework commits him to the idea that this 
‘true’ self – ‘higher’ self – will be unknown to an empirical (‘lower’) self.40  Almost needless 
to say, a contemporaneous political agenda hovers in the background, which these liberal 
philosophies could at least be made to speak to, even assuming that was not the intention.
41
  
In political debate, detaching liberalism from utopian conceptions could leave intact the 
minimal or negative liberalism desired. 
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 So if, in the ambit of the Cold War liberals, the utopian reading of totalitarianism has 
its primary application to communism, what empirical support, finally, does that have?  
Assuming that communism will logically be the ‘better fit’ than the reality the Cold War 
liberals leave out: fascism.  Certainly, a story can be told about modern thought in which 
there are successive modifications to inherited ‘utopian’ terms for conceiving the community, 
until we reach a kind of terminus in Stalinist theory and practice.
42
  A plausible, albeit 
abridged, version could run as follows: (a) The pre-Marxian utopian socialists – especially 
Charles Fourier – introduce the idea of a higher self, pictured by Fourier as a body of fully-
coordinated passions.
43
 (b) The young Marx integrates that demand for meaningful human 
experience with terms lifted from Romanticism, before the later Marx identifies the 
‘proletariat’ as the demand’s addressee.44 (c) Lenin goes on to reaffirm this vision of an 
association of men in ‘higher’ freedom (superficially employing a distinction between utopia 
and ‘realism’ in political strategy, though justifying the harshest of measures precisely 
because of the vision).
45
 (d) Stalin, in the conceptual innovation of ‘socialism in one 
country’, shifts Marx’s addressee from proletariat to ‘Russian’ proletariat, thereby taking 
communist utopianism in a direction marginalised in the prior Marxist tradition but that the 
inheritance of utopian terms of reference more than facilitates.
46
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However, in respect of this story, we should note two things.  First, it is not the only 
story that can be told, even about the intellectual history behind Stalinism alone.  This we will 
see with the two subsequent positions assumed in the anti-totalitarian canon.  Second, a 
utopian reading may not, in fact, be without application to Nazism, at least in particular form.  
Indeed, thinking about the utopian content of Nazism allows us to consider how Cold War 
liberals might have offered a more robust account of totalitarian political thought. 
 
Critical theory and the pathologies of reason 
A tradition of critical theory, coming especially to intellectual attention in the 1960s, narrated 
totalitarianism rather differently, chiefly by implicating science, thereby dislodging a 
consensus concerning the dangers of utopianism.  Critical theorists were often disinclined to 
use the term ‘totalitarian’ directly, not least since they saw it as a Cold War rhetorical prop.47  
Nonetheless, when they came to outline the affiliation between science, domination, and 
modern society at large, totalitarianism was their principal subject.  Like the Cold War 
liberals, the critical theorists inflated one theme that the structural model emphasised.  But in 
contrast to Friedrich and Brzezinski, instead of casting science in the instrumental role of 
providing resources for the extension of state power – sustaining monopolies of 
communications, aiding the work of a secret police – they gave science the constitutive role 
in totalitarianism’s legitimation.  Specifically, it was the critique of technical rationality that 
they deemed capable of bringing into focus the ‘hidden’ forms of domination that connected 
the modern liberal mainstream to more transparently-coercive regimes.  In this line of 
interpretation, there is a continuity that runs between the neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt 
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School and the poststructuralism of Michel Foucault.
48
  To the question of how political and 
social life should be conceived in the wake of recent experience, Max Horkheimer, Theodor 
Adorno, and Foucault all answered: by rethinking the commitment to reason.  Further, the 
agenda took its cue from Horkheimer’s pre-war declaration, which found special resonance in 
the sixties: ‘Anyone who doesn’t want to speak about capitalism should also keep quiet about 
fascism’. 49   Although the line of interpretation is one more nuanced than is sometimes 
presented, a general assessment takes us to two specific shortcomings, excepting the tendency 
to hyperbole.  First is an over-emphasis on ‘everyday’ manifestations of controlled 
subjectivity (following from Horkheimer’s injunction to theorise totalitarianism from within 
capitalism).  Second is a mishandling of the scientific ethos of the totalitarian programmes in 
genocide, via their reduction to broader features of a modern ‘bureaucratic’ mentality.  In 
turn, these two shortcomings can be described as follows; though in such a way that might 
lead us to accept the validity of a qualified version of the interpretation. 
 At the core of the critical theory account is the idea that science is constitutive of 
totalitarianism because modern reason, in its dominant technical, ‘instrumental’ form, is 
complicit in domination.  ‘Enlightenment is totalitarian’, propose Horkheimer and Adorno, 
since the attempt to transcend repressive myth with liberating reason necessarily results in 
reason’s own repression of that judged hostile because it persists in being unknowable: 
Enlightenment and dictator ‘know’ things and men, respectively, only insofar as they are able 
to ‘manipulate’ them.50  Foucault explicitly took up the same connection, as evidenced in this 
statement he made, when asked to sum up the total of his research: ‘The relationship between 
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rationalisation and the excesses of political power is evident.  And we should not need to wait 
for bureaucracy or the concentration camps to recognise the existence of such relations’.51  
In its barebones, then, common to critical theory is a thesis whereby reason is a tool in 
the service of power because it legitimises knowledge claims and obstructs ethical objections 
to prescribed courses of action.  This is a thesis that might well seem to support the 
extension-of-capitalism reading of totalitarianism.  Also contained within the critical theory 
account, though, is a more discriminating evaluation, in which science gives substantive 
ideological content to an actual totalitarian project.  On this reading it is really ‘scientism’ as 
distinctive worldview, rather than as technique, that puts the meat on the bones of the 
totalitarian ‘New Man’. 52   At times, for instance, Dialectic of Enlightenment explicitly 
counterpoises totalitarian ‘barbarism’ to liberal capitalism.  One such case is their discussion 
of anti-Semitism: where capitalism responds to instrumental rationality’s impoverishment of 
human experience with (false) gratification in the culture industry, elsewhere the same 
impoverished subjects are directed to find gratification in wreaking vengeance on 
scapegoated minorities.
53
  At such times, Horkheimer and Adorno give rather more of what is 
due to the exceptions at stake.  Not all, though, because the second weakness of the critical 
theory account comes into view on the same example.   
A persistent (though not omnipresent) temptation of the critical theory account is to 
articulate a quasi-functionalist, bureaucratic ‘cog-in-the-machine’ theory of the political 
violence of modern states.
54
  In Horkheimer and Adorno’s conception, the identities of victim 
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and perpetrator are secondary to the functions performed: ‘Jews’ may be replaced by some 
other victim-group, ‘just as workers can be moved from one wholly rationalized production 
center to another’.55  Yet this tendency is not omnipresent because we find within Foucault’s 
mature positions a more discriminating evaluation, one which consciously transcends the 
quasi-functionalist theory.  That this is a conscious move, moreover, is evident in that it 
would seem part of a decision to replace one conception of totalitarian scientism with 
another.  Foucault’s early conception is the ‘carceral society’: modern disciplinary power 
displaces fixed locations of sovereignty, operates bottom-up through the modern human 
sciences, and impresses itself, insidiously, upon ‘docile bodies’.56  These docile bodies are 
the passive ‘cogs’ that form the stereotypical totalitarian subject and thereby substitute for 
Cold War liberalism’s ideological fanatic. 57  Foucault’s later conception contrasts by 
employing the category of ‘biopolitics’: modern power now has an interest not in docile but 
in ‘fit’ subjects.  Not only does this move restore a rather more credible sense of agency to 
our totalitarian subject; it also entails the possibility of biopolitical concerns being given 
divergent expression in different types of political regime, from welfarist to genocidal.
58
  The 
Nazi episode now becomes exceptional, doing more than merely refining supposedly 
‘Enlightenment’ techniques of social discipline, since it gives distinctive expression to 
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‘racism in its modern, “biologizing”, statist form’.59   Out of this reconsideration we can 
construct the qualified account of totalitarian scientism.  When viable, we may say that it will 
emphasise two aspects: first, scientific classification; second, ‘evolutionism’, in fact.  On the 
one hand, science legitimises what Foucault referred to as ‘dividing practices’, manifest 
generally in modern bureaucratic rationality, but manifest with rather more extreme 
possibilities when marking off those as racially-without-value, for instance.  On the other, 
science also opens up those possibilities in view of an idea of the evolution of ‘the species’ 
coming to inform rules governing the articulation of knowledge, evolutionism being 
especially susceptible to being made to endorse the claims of scientific racism.
60
   
 Qualification due side, there should be little surprise that the critical theory account 
can be made to illuminate Nazism, in view of particular reasons.  For all the hyperbole about 
totalitarianism’s continuity with the modern liberal mainstream, many of the key figures had 
a special emotional investment.  The Frankfurt School’s exile in the United States was driven 
by Hitler’s rise to power, and Steven Aschheim’s description of Dialectic of Enlightenment as 
the ‘by-now classic attempt to account for Nazism’ well sums up its wider reputation.61  
While the appearance of Foucault’s work, and poststructuralism in general, might be located 
broadly within a crisis in the intellectual authority of Marxism in post-war France, Foucault’s 
biographer equally finds reason to emphasise that ‘throughout his life’ his subject was 
‘haunted by the memory of Hitler’s total war and the Nazi death camps’;62 certainly, while 
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Foucault’s reflection on the Holocaust, so far as published work goes, is neither sustained nor 
systematic, any ‘genealogy’ of the Gulag is absent from his work.63  To factor in contexts of 
reference to our appraisal, we may consider that discernible alongside the agenda to (re-)root 
‘fascism’ in capitalism, with greater sophistication than other leftist thought permitted, is a 
particular emotional dynamic.
64
  In complex ways attention is being given, variously, to the 
Nazi period, to capitalism, and to a crisis in orthodox Marxism.  Hence we cannot simply (as 
in Cold War liberalism’s case) label critical theory’s account of totalitarianism one-sided.  
But note, that complexity should not be mistaken for an analytical virtue.  For example, not 
the investigation of Soviet communism, rather self-serving politics, was principally bound up 
with the delegitimation of ‘scientism’, because identifying Soviet communism in those terms 
permitted Western Marxism – the otherwise opaque category to which critical theory shared 
an allegiance – to be default-defined in opposition.65 
 For the time being we should consider only the purchase that the (amended) critique 
of totalitarian scientism has upon Nazism’s history.  In the light of our earlier assertion that 
utopianism might account for one part – if only one part – of the intellectual background to 
Stalinism, the historical evidence might be taken to suggest something similar here.  An 
articulation of a scientistic strand can be viewed as built sequentially, to reprise our earlier 
exercise.  (a) A conception of the nation is, across the nineteenth-century, transformed into a 
conception of race, where important markers are Arthur Comte de Gobineau, who not only 
provides the basis for separating members of different racial categories, but also introduces a 
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racial interpretation of history,
66
 and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who both (re)points that 
racial interpretation in the direction of progress, not decline (as Gobineau had), and fixates on 
one particular racial category: the Jews.
67
 (b) Racial conceptions become reconfigured 
biologically, in interaction with wider cultural forces like social Darwinism.
68
 (c) 
Approaching the period of the Third Reich itself, racial miscegenation is redescribed as a 
principally ‘Jewish’ threat to the heredity of the Aryan racial stock.69  Anti-Semitism does not 
exhaust the entirety of Nazi ideology, and a defect of Yvonne Sherratt’s account of Hitler’s 
intellectual pedigree is to imply otherwise.
70
  But anti-Semitism, in racial and not religious 
form, was the centrepiece of Nazism’s scientistic current.  The failure of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment to have pinpointed exactly, rather than abstrusely, where modern science was 
implicated in totalitarianism is, on the strength of the account just indicated, to have 
downplayed the specific grounding to Nazi anti-Semitism in a fear of the ‘biologised’ 
Other.
71
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The revolutionary passion in French anti-totalitarian thought 
A third school emphasises a final theme to be addressed – revolutionary violence.  This can 
be presented as a distinctly ‘French’ entry to the anti-totalitarian canon.  Really, it consists in 
a revisionist historiographic position on the French Revolution, though we ought to register 
Sunil Khilnani’s point that historiography can function as political theory ‘by other means’.72  
To the question of how we ought to think about politics post-Hitler and post-Stalin, this is a 
position that responds approximately as follows: by being particularly attentive to the 
expectations that political actors might invest in political violence, expectations that – if they 
pass unnoted – unwisely lead us to accommodate those actors, by rationalising their ends and 
means.  Locating this position is more challenging than was for our previous two. 
Before the revolutionary historians, critical theorists had sought to call attention to 
‘bloodless’ domination.  Theirs was a departure from the structural model of totalitarianism 
which, in Friedrich and Brzezinski’s early conception, had made explicit space for ‘terror’.  
Revolutionary historians now wrested the emphasis back to political terror, specifically in its 
Jacobin episode, though they disagreed with Friedrich and Brzezinski on its nature.  
Totalitarian terror was not simply the repression of opposition.
73
  Nor even was totalitarian 
terror an expediency for the sake of a greater good: the utilitarian justification.  Rather, an 
important impetus to the violence that historians like François Furet found in the discourses 
of revolutionary political cultures was regeneration.  Though the primary study was of France 
in the 1790s, the coverage extended to the twentieth century, since the connection was to 
have thought about political violence in relation to ‘identity’, violence being pictured as 
transforming identity, so that acts of violence themselves might help give shape to a New 
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Man and a new society.
74
  Two generations of commentators in post-war France made this 
connection.  The first – a largely neglected voice – was that of Raymond Aron and Albert 
Camus, in the 1950s.   The second came to maturity in the 1970s, the decade instead of 
France’s ‘antitotalitarian moment’.75  In neither case do we find, on the basis of a survey of 
the relevant texts, an unambiguous explication of an identity-related justification of 
totalitarian political violence, and of course to hold these texts to that particular standard 
would only be to set them up to fail for reasons we have so far not defended.  But these 
commentators can be faulted, perhaps, for indecision about what it was that they did want to 
say.  Proceeding to survey that allows us, once again, to pinpoint two shortcomings.  Here, 
the veracity of this line of critique of totalitarian violence is obscured, first, by an ambiguity 
that is general, but expressed especially in insufficiently-discriminating recourse to religious 
metaphor; and second, by a pattern of historical reductionism, in which a reading of one 
event is projected back onto that of another.   
Camus, in The Rebel, took as his target the Sartrean attempt to justify violence 
philosophically, going all the way back to Jacobinism to engage that target.  But aside from 
ascribing totalitarian violence a deep history, so that it could not be written off in terms of 
contingent ‘excesses’, he left unclear the precise relationship he was trying to discern 
between ‘metaphysical’ rebellion and ‘historical’ rebellion. 76   Aron, writing in various 
places,
77
 was plainer.  He exposed a ‘myth of Revolution’ whose charms, he implied, had 
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even obstructed Camus’ efforts to render it lucid, doing so by separating a commonsensical, 
sociological conception of revolution from one grounded in a dramatic ‘expectation of a 
break with the normal trend of human affairs’; a move that came far closer, analytically, to 
isolating the regenerative aspect.
78
  However, Aron detracted from this clarity in the use he 
made of ‘secular religion’ theory.79  The religious idiom he was keen to apply could be 
helpful when there was an analogy to be made – for which the casting of revolution in an 
‘eschatological’ role was apt, permitting the conveying of expectations of salvation lying 
behind a sudden catastrophic moment.
80
  But just as often Aron was less judicious, rooting 
totalitarian politics per se in alternative outlets for depleted religious belief.
81
  A focus on the 
second generation shows repeat evidence of the ambiguity problem, and even greater signs of 
historical reductionism.  When François Furet came to challenge the ‘social interpretation’ of 
the French Revolution, he was either uncertain, or hesitant, about what connected the 1790s 
with the revolutionary politics of the twentieth century.
82
  For the most part he was content to 
implicate them together in a variant of the utilitarian justification for violence: the unbounded 
revolutionary dictatorship, on the Jacobin precedent, as the only means of preserving unity in 
times of danger.
83
  Only on occasion did he directly identify revolutionary violence as 
regenerative, doing so in his conception of ‘the revolutionary passion’, connoting the fusion 
of bourgeois self-hatred, extreme voluntarism, and ‘immanence’ that Jacobinism passed on.  
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‘The revolutionary passion’, Furet wrote, ‘transforms everything into politics’.84  Notable is 
how casually this historical transfer (supposed only fascism and communism combined) is 
invoked: who influences whom, exactly?
85
 
 Where two problems that circumvent the critique of totalitarian revolutionary violence 
are internal to the arguments, again the external target is specific. Emblematic is Furet’s 
thesis: ‘Today the Gulag leads us to reflect afresh on the Terror, by virtue of its ideational 
project’.86  To rehearse a now well-known story, the context of reference can be viewed as 
cultural, whereby in a particular intellectual milieu, anti-totalitarianism functioned as overdue 
reckoning with Marxism, now appraised in the light of both a record of Soviet violence – Red 
Terror – and a rethink of the contemporary relationship with a (national) revolutionary 
tradition.  For both Camus and Aron, discrediting Sartre’s political positions, taken up in the 
company of other Soviet ‘fellow-travellers’, was often the background concern.  From 1974 
onwards, Solzhenitsyn’s revelations were often cited as the prompt.87  The reckoning with 
Marxism should not, though, entice us to reduce French anti-totalitarian thought to a simple 
reprise of Cold War liberalism, because one purpose of locating the former’s position 
carefully is to show that its commitments are distinct.  Both schools may have looked upon a 
reformed communism as without prospect, since for both the ‘problem’ was deep-rooted in 
communism’s intellectual history.  But in the second school that problem shifts from abstract 
idealism to a body of thought on the (realist’s) question of the justification of violence.   
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How does the outline of a corresponding historical narrative stand up to the available 
evidence, textual and otherwise?  In the very least, modifications would have to be made to 
the idea that a straight line connects Lenin and Stalin to an originary, Jacobin proposition that 
violence in politics can be a regenerative force: (a) That is because the proposition may pre-
date the French Revolution: Machiavelli, for instance, pondered whether men’s exercise of 
martial capacities could rebound back onto their capacities as citizens, serving to counter 
private interest.
88
  (b) Because, even in Robespierre, the proposition may have been 
secondary to an ‘instrumental’ logic, terror being necessity as much as purification.89 (c) 
Because the theme that violence could be wedded to moral rejuvenation largely bypassed 
Marx and Engels, even while they were sometimes given to overstep the utilitarian ‘mid-
wife’ justification that historical teleology provided.90 (d) The evidence would seem rather 
that both early and late Bolshevism reconnected with the theme.  Consider Trotsky – ‘to 
make the individual sacred we must destroy the social order which crucifies him’ – or 
Stalin’s campaign for the ‘intensification of the class struggle’, accompanied by demands for 
Soviet political subjects to be ‘active’ and ‘energetic’ fighters.91  To say the least, the Soviet 
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embrace of the idea that acts of violence could be creative was not undiluted.  But Camus, 
Aron, and Furet were right to seek to illuminate the background to a communist orientation 
on violence that could exceed expediency.     
 
Rethinking the canon’s insights? 
Appropriate to our exercise at this point is to take stock and review.  We began by suggesting 
that an anti-totalitarian canon will include all those twentieth-century political theorists who 
asked a question regarding totalitarianism’s meaning for political life, at least in some 
permutation.  With our particular purposes in view – to use that canon to reconstruct an 
account of totalitarian ideology – we then went on to propose that those theorists can be 
located across three significant schools of thought:  Cold War liberals, critical theorists, and 
revisionist historians in France, were all drawn to attempt to validate accounts of 
totalitarianism.  In the course of undertaking those attempts, we have reflected that each 
school came up against three problems.  The first obstacle consisted in the constraints 
imposed by time and place: we have tried to note exactly where each school was prompted to 
ask a more particular question – about Marxism, about Nazism, even liberalism, or else more 
distinct historical events.  The second obstacle lay in the argumentative strategies employed, 
where for each school we amplified two weaknesses: conceptual conflation and bifurcation 
(Cold War liberals), generalisation beyond political dictatorships and reduction to 
bureaucracy (critical theorists), ambiguity and historical reductionism (revisionist historians).  
A third obstacle concerns the historical evidence available.  What we could note here is that 
because the interpretations of modern political experience that we have discussed are 
conceived at quite a high level of abstraction, it is possible – selectively – to marshal 
evidence in support of them all, without pronounced differences in the plausibility of those 
applications.  Hence this possible inference: the claims that utopianism, scientism and 
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revolutionary violence have to constitute totalitarian political thought are not mutually 
exclusive of one another; rather, these three sources might be reconcilable.  The possibility of 
that reconciliation takes us towards the final stage of our exercise.  Yet before that, we need 
to consider the scope of each account’s potential application.   
Already, in reflecting on the argumentative strategies employed across the postwar 
conversation, we have indicated how it is that the set of intellectual commitments that make 
up each of our currents of thought need to be rethought.  Continuing to amend the postwar 
accounts allows us to extend the applications.  Specifically, this part of our exercise enables 
us to bring into view, in turn, a story that Cold War liberals could have told about Nazism; a 
story that critical theorists could have told about Stalinism; and one that revisionist historians 
could have told about an orientation on the right in politics.  Note that in this we return too to 
our earlier discussion on ‘the canon’.  For identifying the ‘representative thinker’ of current 
of thought is a significant step in clarifying its complexion. 
 
Nazi utopianism 
Cold War liberals tended to employ a conception of utopia whereby there was a collective 
political subject receptive to its message.  Into that collective political subject, individuals 
with plural identities dissolved; far worse still was the fate of those defined as outside the 
collective political subject: ‘gas chambers, gulags, genocide’, said Berlin, ‘are the price men 
must pay for the felicity of future generations’.92  In order to render an account of totalitarian 
utopianism optimally robust, what we need to pick out is a single most important feature of 
the Cold War liberal imaginary.  This is a collective political subject’s invariable character as 
‘oppressed’ – hence for that subject, eutopia’s appeal, the Greek root designating ‘happy-
                                                          
92
 Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, in The Crooked Timber of Humanity, (ed.) H. Hardy (London, 1991), p. 16. 
Rethinking totalitarian ideology 
 
 
 
32 
 
place’.  We need to pick this feature out because it is first clue towards appreciating how 
Nazism functioned as utopia as well.   
In unrevised form, the Cold War liberal position is inconsistent with recognition of 
Nazism’s utopian character.  In the mainline of that position, totalitarian utopias are 
rationalistic utopias.  They project a social world based on rational principles in the place of 
an ‘irrational’ status quo.  By the conventional contrast, the ‘irrational’ is precisely what 
Nazism appeals to.
93
  In Berlin, ‘monism’ usually pictures a rationalistic social harmony, 
because it is through Reason (capital ‘R’) that human beings have access to knowledge as to 
what constitute harmonious ends.  In Talmon, it is rationalism that threatens to become 
‘messianic’.  Subjects of oppression, however, can be thought to want to embrace utopias not 
to achieve their ‘rational’ selves – rather their ‘true’ selves.  The two may overlap, but they 
may not.  The key point follows.  Properly understood, totalitarian utopias are (and must be) 
utopias of authenticity; they may be (though need not be) rationalistic utopias.  This revised 
understanding permits us not only, as we shall see shortly, to identify the outline of a utopian 
strand in National Socialism, but also to locate more accurately the utopian current in Soviet 
communism.  Moved to centre stage is the notion of man’s estrangement from his ‘species-
being’ under the conditions of modern social life: Marx’s non-alienated New man – the idea 
that Berlin’s warning about positive liberty leans so heavily on – thereby comes to have, at its 
core, the claim to represent  a true self.  There are suggestive implications also for how a 
conception of utopianism per se might be modified, with totalitarian utopianism being one 
sub-set thereof.   We might now say that the general feature of any utopian theory is to trace 
all the ills of existing society back to a single source; that this identity in form allows for 
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variation in content (rationalist/ irrationalist, hedonist/ ascetic, etc.);
94
 and that the particular 
feature of totalitarian utopias is to trace ills back to a state of in-authenticity.
95 
 
 Further to the content of a totalitarian utopianism, what also stands in need of 
correction, from the mainline of the Cold War liberal position, is the conceived point of 
origin.  Here specifically, the usefulness of identifying its representative thinker enters the 
picture.  We saw earlier that it was Marx-qua-utopian whom Cold War liberals fixed attention 
on, though ‘the Enlightenment’ was also cast as an important origin (and from which Marx’s 
alleged complicity was only an extension); Enlightenment rationalism, in Berlin and Talmon 
respectively, fed political projects that were ‘monist’ and ‘messianic’.96  The Enlightenment 
thinker that Cold War liberals particularly levelled accusations at was Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, and although it is Rousseau who can help clarify the origin and content of 
totalitarianism’s utopian strand, this is not for the reasons they identified, one consequence of 
which is significant, insofar as it redirects our attention to the counter-Enlightenment.   
Rousseau’s general will was the central reference (as it was also for Bertrand Russell, in his 
infamous ‘Hitler is an outcome…’ formulation).97  The general will was taken as emblematic 
of Enlightenment rationalism. The general will amounted to the will of a collective subject.  
And on Berlin’s rendition of positive liberty especially, the general will entailed the division 
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of true and illusory selves – the latter, naturally, in need of being ‘forced to be free’.98  But 
aside from Rousseau’s concept being atypical of the Enlightenment mainstream, this reading 
misses how, in the emergence of the utopian current we are identifying, the reception of the 
Rousseau of the Social Contract was layered upon a prior reception of the Rousseau of the 
two Discourses.  The latter might be thought of as Rousseau the counter-Enlightenment 
thinker – the Rousseau who identified ‘nature with simplicity’ and celebrated ‘the inner 
life’.99  Accordingly, we might obtain clarity on totalitarianism’s utopian strand by picturing 
collectivism intersecting with an imperative to recover a ‘natural’ condition, most 
characteristic of the early Rousseau: ‘all institutions that place man in contradiction with 
himself are of no value’.100  Not that this is simply an exercise in picturing so for clarity’s 
sake.  Upon the basis of this imperative, it is fair to say, was how Rousseau was read by 
would-be totalitarians; notably, across both the post-Enlightenment right and left.
 
Let us consider once more the utopian background to Stalinism, before we apply the 
reconceived account to Nazism.  On the post-Enlightenment left, we gave significance earlier 
to the   pre-Marxian ‘utopian’ socialists, for having introduced the idea of a higher self.  But 
informing this conception was already, perhaps, Rousseau’s project, where we might see not 
an introduction, but a substitution: of Fourier’s body of fully-coordinated passions, say, for 
Rousseau’s soul of moral conscience.101   Rousseau’s reception on the right does not even call 
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for the caveat, because looking for the take-up of a utopia of authenticity – this time, in ir-
rationalist form – leads us to plausible textual evidence.  To recognise that, we first have to 
locate Nazism’s utopian strand in overall terms.  As with the case on the left, that strand 
ought to be viewed as emerging out of frustration with Enlightenment individualism, but this 
time as developing as a utopia of ‘nation’, rather than a utopia of ‘class’ (and note: not yet of 
‘race’, because that must await legitimation by nineteenth-century science).102  Reviewing 
some of the textual evidence for this characterisation presents a final opportunity as well to 
amend the relevant positions associated with Cold War liberalism. 
What we are suggesting now, then, is that National Socialism, in one specific part of 
its ideological make-up, comprised an irrationalist, collectivist utopia of national authenticity.  
Claudia Koonz emphasises ‘the desire for moral rejuvenation of the volk’, and the ‘socialist’ 
component – though care is called for – should be seen as the means to that end.103  Two 
distant intellectual origins that laid foundations for this conception – origins that Isaiah 
Berlin, in particular, was confused about – are Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte. 
Herder’s importance is to have given voice to a particular combined idea, and to have 
done so, indeed, in creative adoption of Rousseau.   The aspirations Herder invested in 
nationalism – the combined idea, because for Herder it was simultaneously collectivist and an 
affirmation of (group) uniqueness – grew out of his hostility to Enlightenment rationalism: 
the ‘cold philosophy of the age’.  From Rousseau’s Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts 
Herder drew out the case that Enlightenment rationalism was fundamentally incapable of 
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picturing the community in terms genuinely resonant of human experience.
104
  He concluded 
that authentic human experience – the simplest of ‘delights’ – had to be bounded within the 
limits of the nation, because of shared language; and therefore, that  every language-base, 
cultural expression of national character had to be cherished: ‘every nation has its centre of 
happiness within itself’. 105   The conclusion, then, may have transcended Rousseau.  
Nonetheless, it was a reading of his early texts that led Herder to outline several propositions 
vital to an irrationalist utopia of national authenticity: that reason could separate man from 
community; that the natural community was one whose distinctive culture had organically 
developed; and that there was a connection between the realisation of the human self and 
participation in national project.
106
  A credible liberal position might have made this 
connection.
107
  Yet Berlin did the opposite, turning Herder into an anti-totalitarian by proxy, 
in virtue of his pluralism’s supposed challenge to the Enlightenment’s (dangerous) 
monism.
108
  The mistake is instructive rather than incidental, because the more convincing 
account of totalitarian utopias will contend (contra Berlin) that always privileged are select 
portions of humanity – nations, classes – not ‘humanity’ per se.109   
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Secondly, Fichte took the utopia of nation significantly further, because his was an 
explicitly political – not only cultural – programme.110  Here, Talmon certainly took note of 
what Fichte’s conception of a nation amounted to: a ‘messianic’ project, in which particular 
peoples – not classes, as in Marxian ‘totalitarian democracy’ – could be active agents in 
realising utopian schemes for fundamental human improvement.
111
  But by that point he was 
obliged to have revised his original conceptual framework, the one that coincided with the 
main line of Cold War liberalism: totalitarian democracy is no longer exclusively an affair of 
the left, nor is it exclusively rationalist, because in the early nineteenth century utopian 
schemes fork off into two types (one left and rationalist, one right and irrationalist).
112
  There 
is also a moment in Berlin’s work – again, obscured in the mainline of Cold War liberalism – 
in which he has to allow for a kind of irrationalist variant of positive liberty, one indeed 
epitomised by Fichte:  Berlin earlier associated the perversion of liberty with the reaction 
against the Enlightenment, because ‘romantic liberty’  likewise disrupted the ‘nuclear, 
central, minimal meaning of liberty’ as the absence of restraint or coercion on the part of 
other human beings, its specific quality being to envisage liberty as the individual’s self-
realisation through union with some larger movement.
113
  Hence, then, we might appreciate 
the significance that Fichte had for Nazi utopianism.  In his conception of the self as a ‘kind 
of supra-self, a transcendental entity’114 – that the nation embodied – he was to first develop 
the idea that freedom must signify submission to the nation. 
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Marxism, Stalinism, and scientism 
We have just seen, then, how the utopian critique can be modified so as (contra the intent) to 
make sense of National Socialism.  Our next task is to restate the scientistic critique so that it 
has application to the intellectual history behind Stalinism.   
Critical theorists were certainly opposed to Stalinism.  The potential complicity 
therein of a late ‘determinist’ Marx was one reason they made appeal to a young (non-
scientistic) alternative.  This was ironic, if the Cold War liberal story carries force: it was to 
appeal to those texts and concepts already pointing Marxism in the direction of totalitarian 
utopianism.  But the irony should not detract from the capacity of the critique of totalitarian 
scientism to accommodate strands of the histories of the ideologies of far right and far left 
simultaneously, provided a careful distinction is made between the two.  We saw earlier that 
the critical theory account points to extreme, totalitarian possibilities in light of two possible 
commitments of the modern scientific worldview: categorisation and evolutionism.  In turn, 
what this points to is an apt representative thinker by which to frame the connection: Darwin.  
Critical theorists invoked figures of their own to serve the same illustrative purpose: Homer’s 
Odysseus (‘the self who always restrains himself’),115 the Marquis de Sade (instrumental 
rationality free of moral conscience),
116
 and Jeremy Bentham (architect of the Panopticon).
117
  
It is the later Foucault, however, wresting the emphasis from the eighteenth-century 
‘Enlightenment’ to Europe’s nineteenth century, who helps us arrive at an important 
amendment to the received account.  Darwinism can be said to consist in a set of ethics that 
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were in important ways ‘post-Enlightenment’, emphasising not free will and optimism, but 
fatalism and a kind of pessimism.
118
  And politically, Darwinism was open-ended – 
Darwinian concepts could be adapted and co-opted divergently.  Hence the contrast we shall 
elucidate now, the consequence of which is to expand totalitarian scientism’s scope of 
reference: National Socialism and Stalinism thought differently about the nature of history 
and history’s units, and in this the idea of legitimation by different Darwins is a useful 
characterisation.  The two cases share an inverted pattern.  
 On the one hand, Nazism stopped short of embracing the Darwinian-inspired thesis of 
historical inevitability, where Marxism embraced that thesis full-on.  One way of giving 
clearer meaning to the outline of the particular scientistic strand that we sketched earlier is to 
say that what   National Socialism took together from Gobineau, Chamberlain and the social 
Darwinists was a strong theory of history (i.e. ‘strong’, because it made races crucial 
collective units) but not a deterministic theory.  Mein Kampf makes plentiful reference to the 
‘laws of Nature’, resonating with the thesis of Capital: a ‘rigid law of necessity’ entails ‘the 
victory of the best and the strongest’.119  Yet also registered in Hitler’s writings is an anxiety 
that this racial value – though given in nature – will never find assertion, through the required 
human agency.
120
  Of course, that the communist tradition did embrace historical inevitability 
is not a novel claim; though it is appropriate to flesh out the ways in which this embrace can 
be considered – fatally – ‘scientistic’, as well as where critical theory’s blindspots lay.  
Briefly, we may suggest as follows: Communism’s ‘developmentalist’ account of history is 
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rooted in its Hegelian origin  –  despite critical theory’s appeal to a young Marx – 121 this debt 
to Hegel being canonised by Engels, whose thinking (at least as received in Soviet Marxism) 
was unmistakably Darwinian.
122
  Marx’s own thinking was less so,123 though over time his 
identifications shifted from Hegel to Darwin.  Thus he superimposed on Hegel’s 
developmentalism the (Darwinist) idea of progress proceeding unconsciously, via conflict.  It 
was Engels, regardless, who formalised the legacy, doing so by exceeding the proposition 
that history was subject to its own laws, because the laws of nature now extended into human 
history; in this, Engels influenced both Plekhanov and Lenin’s accounts of ‘dialectical 
materialism’.124  At the end of this chain is Stalin, who elevated dialectical materialism into 
state doctrine, and quoted liberally from Engels (who else?) when called upon to explicate the 
theory.
125
  Thus was the embrace of historical inevitability fatal, because the expectation that 
‘qualitative’ social change was ‘natural and inevitable’ helped silence ethical objection. 
 On the other hand (to continue the contrast of how it was that two movements came to 
think about history) where the units of history are concerned, rather than its overall nature, 
the Darwinian connection is reversed.  In place of National Socialism on race, the communist 
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tradition was never prone to extend ‘biological’ conceptualisation to its principal units.  Thus, 
contra the National Socialist case, membership of a social class was not an inherited 
characteristic.  The communist ‘tradition’ is an important marker though, because it helps 
direct our attention to how – during the period of Stalinism itself – these bounds may have 
been breached.  There, in the ideological decontestation of class, Soviet discourse came 
closest to imitating Nazi discourse.  Circumspection is required in the interpretation.  
Imitation came in virtue of a ‘nationalisation’ of the (general) terms of Marxist discourse 
reflecting back onto the (particular) understanding of social classes.  An enthusiastic 
nationalism was not an integral ‘part of original Marxism’. 126  Nor can we find Stalin 
retreating from original Marxism’s cosmopolitan position early on.  In 1913, he is to be found 
writing sympathetically on regional autonomy within a superseded Russian Empire; and 
certainly, rejecting the notion that national character is biologically-determined: true to Marx, 
it was a ‘reflection of the conditions of life’.127  Yet commentators may be right to associate 
late Stalinism’s turn to Russian chauvinism with a distinctive encounter with ‘biopolitics’ 
staged in the Soviet case.  The attempted eradication of national differences through the 
deportation of the non-Russian nationalities meant rigid classification coming to play a part 
in Soviet thinking.   And on that basis, the eclipse of ‘nurture’ by ‘nature’128 could inform the 
perception of enemies of the regime of all kinds – (re)cast as ‘vermin’ and ‘filth’.129  Class 
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enemies too could come to be defined by objective characteristics, from which they had no 
opportunity of escape.
130
 
 
A rightist orientation on revolutionary violence 
The last account that calls for extension beyond its original scope of reference is the critique 
of revolutionary violence.  We saw earlier that, for a revisionist historiographic position on 
the French Revolution, what holds together Jacobinism-Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, as a 
singular, on-going revolutionary project, is the theme of violence qua regeneration.  Is that 
theme articulated to a significant level in the intellectual background to Nazism? Our answer 
must be yes, albeit with a clarificatory distinction. 
Our attention is initially steered away by Nazism’s rejection of any ideological 
kinship with 1789.
131
  Though on closer consideration, that rejection only points to the utility 
of thinking in terms of two discrete, largely self-enclosed orientations on revolutionary 
violence that were available for totalitarians to draw on: one left, one right.  The distinction is 
that the rightist orientation is equally informed by an idea of moral rejuvenation but has no 
anchor in the French revolutionary era.  Yet there are good reasons for tracing such an 
orientation through to its reception and reworking in the Nazi era: first, far more so than 
Stalinism, Nazism is characterised by a celebration of violence as an intrinsic quality; second, 
there is validation in the ‘new consensus’ in fascist studies, whereby fascism (rather than 
‘counter-’ revolutionary) has its own distinctive sense of revolution.132  A further reason 
involves what we can infer about both orientations, left and right: namely, that totalitarian 
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revolutionary violence – like totalitarian utopianism, like totalitarian scientism – has a post-
Enlightenment ethos.  In clarification of that ethos as manifest here, Nietzsche is the most 
eligible representative thinker (though with some careful qualification required).
133
  Textual 
evidence concerning Nietzsche’s place within the leftist orientation suggests the connection is 
wrongly obscured in the mainline of French anti-totalitarian thought, because in the 
construction of Soviet violence between original Marxism and early Bolshevism, the 
integration of Nietzschean themes  is important facet:  Lenin borrowed from figures in the 
Russian tradition of revolutionary conspiracy who identified with nihilism;
134
 Trotsky’s 
defence of terrorism can be viewed as exhortation to express a ‘will to power’. 135  The 
Nietzschean connection that Bolshevism can be thought to share with Nazism is more 
general: his significance is to have challenged the prohibition on violence (a prohibition 
endorsed by the mainstream of the Enlightenment) by proposing a cult of ‘hardness’, in place 
of compassion. Let us try to identify where it is that Nietzsche exerts the more particular 
influence in Nazism’s case, by tracing some evolving terms of the rightist orientation. 
 A rightist orientation on revolutionary violence, we have said, has no anchor in the 
French Revolutionary era.  But there is relevance in the reaction to the French Revolution, 
where some commentators have found, but then overplayed, a cue to fascism.
136
 Joseph de 
Maistre’s indictment of the Jacobin Terror as divine punishment ‘for the sake of 
regeneration’ does direct attention to a bizarre mirroring of the Revolution’s own purification 
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metaphor.
137
  It is confirmation also that right and left alike have been prone, historically, to 
construct violence as a creative force.  However, evidence of Maistre’s actual influence on 
later fascist ideologies is thin.
138
 More accurately, we should contend that only post-
Nietzsche does the Nazi practice of revolutionary violence gain real shape.  And the initial 
contribution is a particular reading of Nietzschean texts themselves: the will to power 
undermines the status of objective truth and so myth, rather than reason, will henceforth be 
the basis for (re)producing ‘healthy’ forms of life. 139   That contribution should not be 
overstated, because while it was possible to find in those texts diagnosis of this general 
cultural predicament, Nietzsche himself was uninterested in how the masses might be brought 
to respond to it.  Hence the significance next of Georges Sorel, for having attended to 
precisely that issue:  Sorel, whose own political commitments began at least on the left, 
offered a Nietzschean correction to Marxism whereby the specific myth capable of moving 
the masses was that of the general strike;
140
 and because Sorel noted that strikes could 
involve violence, he was led to consider the ethics of violence explicitly.  Therein, crucially, 
we might locate the transmission to Nazism of distinctive version of violence’s identity-
related justification.   
For Sorel, ‘proletarian violence’, as a ‘pure and simple manifestation of class war’, 
promised not so much to yield material advantage, as to ‘save the world from barbarism’: it 
could restore the class struggle with ‘energy’.141  Prior to now, much has been made of 
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Sorel’s reception in fascism in the Italian case.142  But in the particular respect of violence, 
what we are suggesting is that Sorel casts a more useful light on the German case – even, to 
be sure, in the absence of a direct relationship.
143
  Recognising so requires us to give greater 
import to a conceptual substitution possible from Sorel’s original scheme: revolutionary 
nation for revolutionary proletariat.
144
  Of course, this is a substitution that Italian Fascism 
can also be pictured as making (and where the substitution’s appeal may have lain likewise 
partly in the 1914-18 experience).
145
  Yet the substitution was performed with special 
significance in National Socialism.
146
   There, violence was not only sanctioned on a different 
scale, but regenerative violence found impetus in other sources, absent in Fascism. 
Combination was key.  ‘Redemptive anti-Semitism’, for instance, had utopian and scientistic 
determinants as well, since (for the anti-Semite) the transformation of the self that was 
projected would equally entail eradicating an infected presence and overcoming national-
collective decline.
147
 
 
Conclusion – totalitarian ideology on a ‘Collingwoodian’ approach  
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Finally, our exercise has reached the point to leave behind the validation of theoretical 
accounts in historical texts and other types of political discourse, and to briefly engage a more 
open-ended theme, one principally methodological.  To appreciate why we might wish to 
engage such a theme, recall the claims we began from:  time is ripe for an ideology-oriented 
theory of totalitarianism; an anti-totalitarian canon is a neglected resource; tapping such a 
resource will require careful attention to a range of issues, conceptual, contextual, and 
empirical.  Recall also that our earlier discussion on method.  A plausible perspective on 
totalitarianism and the history of ideas, we suggested, would be one that pictured several 
sources existing in complex relationship with the relevant twentieth-century formations.  We 
have since located those sources, in three particular currents of thought.  All three emerged in 
reaction to the Enlightenment and extended across the intellectual backgrounds to National 
Socialism and Stalinism inclusive.  On this basis, we are able to conclude that ‘totalitarian 
ideology’ comprises a synthesis of (what we have meant by) utopianism, scientism, and 
revolutionary violence.  We must now reflect not on content but on the validity of 
‘totalitarian ideology’, as conceptualisation.   
 We conventionally treat ‘fascist ideology’ and ‘communist ideology’ as valid units for 
analysis.  We withhold that from totalitarian ideology, typically doing so because we wish 
instead – on the remnants of the outdated structural model – to make totalitarianism refer to 
fascism/ communism-in-power. Should we continue to wince at the term?  Not, we might 
think, if we are only identifying a shared ideational space, not challenging ‘rival’ 
designations, though some putative ideational equivalence.  And analytically, we have 
deliberately provided for the synthesis of the same currents of thought in dis-similar 
proportion and/ or character.  But this alone will not justify the conceptualisation.  That also 
invites an account of the understanding of ideology itself being applied.  Here, our central 
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claim can be that ‘totalitarian’ ideology is defined by particular performance at three 
significant levels of legitimation. 
 Why should other understandings of ideology be either unavailable or insufficient?  
First, ‘fascist studies’ has an established concern with identifying a ‘fascist minimum’.148  
But proposing a ‘totalitarian minimum’ will be meagre return if that comprises a set of only 
three overlapping ideological features (fewer than have been identified in the fascist case).  
Second, a ‘cluster’ conception of totalitarian ideology might take us further, by connecting 
those features together, where they complement and mutually reinforce.
149
  However, this 
would also be yield to a standpoint external to the object under investigation, the analyst 
inferring the connections for herself.   Hence, third, why a ‘morphological’ conception would 
be more profitable, elucidating those ‘decontestations’ – enacted by totalitarians themselves – 
which lock together common meanings-for-concepts into coherent patterns.
150
  Yet on the 
evidence of this article, no such elucidation is possible.  Totalitarians do not decontest 
uniformly.  For example, some fix meaning for social solidarity in class, others in race.
151
  All 
this points us to a fourth alternative, which we can identify in relation to R.G. Collingwood. 
 An understanding based on the ‘Collingwoodian’ approach takes us back to the 
possibility we considered in connection with the anti-totalitarian canon: that the questions 
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may differ.
152
  There, we were interested in making sense of our ‘secondary-text sources’ for 
totalitarian ideology – theorists’ accounts.  Only now we are interested in first-order thinking 
– totalitarian political thought itself.  Why should a Collingwoodian approach help us to give 
that systematic characterisation? In brief, because it makes it possible to picture how 
utopianism, scientism and revolutionary could have provided totalitarians with particular 
questions they found themselves wanting, or needing, to ask, answers that were capable of 
cohering, but that were equally open to being given local colour.
153
  On the issue of how to 
read a text, Collingwood famously encourages us to reflect: ‘what question did So-and-so 
intend this proposition for an answer’. 154   Assuming we are relaxed about reading 
totalitarianism as a text (which we can be, if braced not to expect sophisticated chains of 
logical reasoning), then the vital insight concerns three significant levels of legitimation that 
thereby come to both register, and validate, totalitarianism’s identity as ideology.  They are 
as follows. 
Level 1 concerns community.  When totalitarians advance propositions that are best 
approximated to utopianism, it is in trying to answer a question about how community ought 
to be constructed, because that (to adopt Collingwood’s terminology) is what ‘arises’.155  In 
these terms, we may now view our assertion that utopianism led Nazism and Stalinism – in 
common – to conceive ‘authentic’ community in reference to a collective political subject, 
but at odds, to locate that subject in different sources of solidarity, and with different 
expectations invested in ‘reason’.  Level 2 concerns history.  Whenever totalitarians invoke 
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scientism, that is in the course of asking how (for their own political project) the terms of 
historical justification should proceed.  Scientism, we have seen, is expansive enough to be 
made to affirm at least two visions of history, as answers: one in which the collective subjects 
that are its principal actors are given scientific classification, and another in which (mainly 
non-scientifically-classified) actors are understood to participate in a deterministic process.  
Level 3 concerns political action.  It is to a question about the nature of conflict that 
revolutionary violence provides answers.  For totalitarians of all hues, the commission of 
violence will not only have an instrumental purpose – to effect a moment of transition – but a 
regenerative purpose as well.  To spell this out via single phrase we have little used: what is 
proposed at the prior two levels, then given final shape at the third, is the totalitarian ‘New 
Man’. 
 We should be clear about the advantages of codifying totalitarian ideology on the 
‘logic of question and answer’.  It allows for the conceptual elasticity that our appraisal of the 
anti-totalitarian canon suggests is required.  We also become reconciled, methodologically-
speaking, to troubling – but ineradicable – points of inconsistency.  Collingwood’s injunction 
that ‘no two propositions can contradict one another unless they are answers to the same 
question’ may be the solution to a long-standing puzzle, what Arendt identified as a dynamic 
animated simultaneously by history’s inexorable laws and a conviction ‘everything is 
possible’.156  Whether political theorists can be reconciled to implications that are normative 
rather than methodological is a different matter.  Our shorthand ‘Rousseau, Darwin, plus 
Nietzsche’ might at least be a start.  For contrary to what is often imagined, that would bide 
us to be wary bedfellows not of those who identified with the Enlightenment, rather of those 
who opposed it.  
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